Incus Project and Migration Trust Boundaries Need Separate Review

2026-11-20来源 dev.toEnglish

Incus Project and Migration Trust Boundaries Need Separate Review

Incus gives teams a convenient way to operate containers and virtual machines, but project isolation is a security claim about who can create, inherit, and move resources. Two issues fixed in Incus 7.6.0 challenge that claim.

Authorization through project context

CVE-2026-130784 is an authorization bypass that lets restricted clients create and access default-project resources by exploiting entitlement checks against the requested project. The advisory describes two consequences: bridge networks with raw.dnsmasq directives can execute code as root on the host, and inherited resources can be manipulated through the ?project= parameter.

The lesson is that a project identifier used in an API call must be part of the authorization decision. Checking the caller against one project and acting on another is a confused-deputy pattern.

Migration peers as code sources

CVE-2026-130780 is a path traversal in migration handling. A malicious migration peer can supply unvalidated dependent volume and snapshot names and write outside the intended directory. The advisory notes that this can create root-owned volumes with attacker content at arbitrary host paths and can bypass storage-pool restrictions.

Migration is often considered an internal operation. Treat a migration peer as a trust-bearing principal, especially when the source is managed by another team.

Response

Upgrade to 7.6.0 or later and verify the running daemon version. Audit restricted projects, default-project networks, inherited profiles, and any use of raw.dnsmasq. Review project-scoped API logs for mismatched project identifiers.

Inventory migration relationships and storage pools. Check for unexpected root-owned volumes, unusual directory names, and failed migration attempts near the disclosure date. If an untrusted migration source existed, preserve the daemon and host filesystem evidence before cleanup.

Long-term controls

Deny raw configuration fields to non-administrative projects. Require explicit approval for migration peers and restrict their network reachability. Alert when a project-scoped request accesses a default or inherited resource. Test isolation with both positive and negative cases, not only with successful project creation.

References

原文:https://www.a8q9.cn/en/article/incus-project-and-migration-trust-boundaries-need-separate-review-f33bb2.html

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